"The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings
always rests on the shoulders of the complainant. The
Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the
complaint by clearly preponderant evidence that warrants the
imposition of the harsh penalty. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the
legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges made against him until the
contrary is proved. An attorney is further presumed as an officer of the Court
to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath.
In this case, complainants failed to discharge their burden of proving
respondents' administrative liability. Granting that the certification of the
QCCPO of the actual date of receipt of the subject NLRC decision has prima
facie credence, this Court finds it is not sufficient to hold
respondents administratively liable as contended by complainants.
While there is incongruity between said certification and the records of
respondents' law firm as to when the subject NLRC decision was actually
received by the latter, there is no clear and convincing evidence presented by
complainants that respondents maliciously made it appear that they received the
decision on a date ten days later than what is reflected on the records of the
QCCPO. Complainants would like to convince this Court that the only logical
explanation as to the discrepancy is that Calucag, a secretary under the employ
of respondents, was ordered by respondents to stamp a much later date instead
of the actual date of receipt for the purpose of extending by ten-day period
within which to file a Motion for Reconsideration under the NLRC Rules of
Procedure. Clearly, such claim is merely anchored on speculation and conjecture
and not backed by any clear preponderant evidence necessary to justify the imposition
of administrative penalty on a member of the Bar." (Joven and Rasing
v. Attys. Cruz and Magsalin, A.C. No. 7686, 31 July 2013)
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