Friday, November 8, 2013

CIVIL LAW; FAMILY LAW; Marriage; Marriages for Purposes of Immigration; Whether or not valid

Republic of the Philippines v. Liberty D. Albios
G.R. No. 198780, 16 October 2013



The case of Republic v. Albios involves a marriage alleged to be entered into by Albios for the purpose of obtaining US citizenship, which failed to materialize. Hence, finding no use for her marriage and arguing that both she and her husband did not really intend to enter into a married life, Albios filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the purpose of declaring her marriage void.

The RTC found the marriage as one made in jest, or for convenience only, and voided the marriage of Albios and her husband. This was later upheld by the Court of Appeals (CA) which reasoned that since there was no intention to enter into a married life, there was no consent to begin with, making the marriage void.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the decision of the CA to the Supreme Court (SC) via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.


Marriage Fraud for Purposes of Immigration

The SC reversed the CA and declared the marriage valid. Before explaining its reason, the SC first delved into the issue of fraud marriages for purposes of immigration in the US, thus -


"The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.  A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.  Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage, and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,  established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married." This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws. It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and inexistent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of United States v. Rubenstein  was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:

. . . But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. . . . Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. . . . It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others. 
(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose." The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee, further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a nonsubsisting one.


Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.  At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving "limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid."


Why Albios' marriage, though entered to obtain US citizenship, is valid


After discussing how US courts have treated fraud marriages for immigration purposes or limited purpose marriages, the SC then proceeded to explain why Albios' marriage cannot be declared void. It held that Albios' marriage is not one made in jest, which is void ab initio, but one where all the elements are present, though the purposes for which it was entered into may be different. As opposed to marriages made in jest, Albios marriage was one where both parties intended to give legal effect to the marriage though Albios' intended US citizenship was not achieved. Both parties' consent were also conscious and intelligent, thus belying the CA's ruling that there was no consent to begin with. 

“The CA's assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties' supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios' marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.

The respondent's marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on.  Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,  are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent's attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent's marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non-disclosure of a previous conviction involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.  It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.”

As can be seen from above, the SC found both parties' consent to be valid because in order to effect the intended change in citizenship, the marriage between Albios and her husband should first be completely legal. Thus, even if it is conceded that Albios' husband's consent was obtained by paying him $2,000.00, this is not enough to declare his consent absent. This is likewise not enough to deem the consent vitiated, which is not, and most especially considering the fact that Albios is not an innocent party who can claim vitiation of consent due to fraud.



Friday, November 1, 2013

CIVIL LAW; CORPORATE REHABILITATION; Jurisdiction of Rehabilitation Court does not include claims by debtor against its own debtors or third parties

Steel Corporation of the Philippines v. Mafpre Insular Insurance Corporation
G.R. No. 201199, 16 October 2013


This case involves a claim by Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP), which was under corporation rehabilitation, for payment of its insurance claims against the respondents Mafpre Insular Insurance Corporation ("Respondents").

SCP won before the Rehabilitation Court (RTC), which was later overturned by the Court of Appeals after the Respondents filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court..

On Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court, the latter upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals.

According to the Supreme Court, while Rehabilitation Proceedings are proceedings in rem and, under the rules, affects all those "affected thereby," this does not include the claims by the debtor against its own debtors or against third parties.

In this case, therefore, and as quoted by the SC, "SCP's insurance claims cannot be considered as 'claims' within the jurisdiction of the trial court functioning as a rehabilitation court. Rehabilitation courts only have limited jurisdiction over the claims by creditors against the distressed company, not on the claims of said distressed company against its debtors. The interim rules define claim as referring to all claims or demands, of whatever nature or character against a debtor or its property, whether for money or otherwise."

The SC thus held that the RTC, as a rehabilitation court, was acting without jurisdiction when it granted SCP's "Motion to Pay" insurance claims against the Respondents, which, not claiming or demanding any property from SCP, cannot be considered bound by or subsumed under the rehabilitation proceedings.

Since SCP's claims are contested and require a full-blown trial, SCP must file a separate action therefor and pay the necessary filing fees.