Can a person be charged with two or more separate and distinct crimes arising from or based on the same act/incident?

Yes. 

A single act can give rise to charges of two or more distinct and separate crimes. This was the ruling in Lumauig vs. People, G.R. No. 166680, 7 July 2014, where the Supreme Court held that two or more charges may be brought against an accused based on the same incident, especially if there is a variance between the elements of the offenses charged.

In Lumauig, the Accused was charged with the crimes of Failure to Render an Account under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), arising from his failure to liquidate a cash advance in his favor within the time required therefor.

After trial, the trial court acquitted the accused of the anti-graft charge, but convicted him under Article 218 of the RPC since he admittedly failed to liquidate the cash advance released to him within the pertinent period.

The accused contested his conviction and claimed that his acquittal under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 should bar his conviction under Article 218 of the RPC considering that the cases against him involve the same cash advance. In other words, he argued that his exoneration in the anti-graft case should exculpate him from further liability under Article 218 of the RPC.

The Supreme Court rejected the said arguments and held that it was not impossible for the accused to be charged with 2 separate crimes in this case, since the elements under the said offenses differ, even if both cases may hinge on the same set of evidence, thus -

"It is undisputed that the two charges stemmed from the same incident.' However, [we have] consistently held that the same act may give rise to two or more separate and distinct charges." Further, because there is a variance between the elements of the two offenses charged, petitioner cannot safely assume that his innocence in one case will extend to the other case even if both cases hinge on the same set of evidence. 

To hold a person criminally liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the following elements must be present: 

(1) That the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; 

(2) That said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions; 

(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; 

(4) That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and 

(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. 

On the other hand, the elements of the felony punishable under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code are: 

(1) That the offender is a public officer whether in the service or separated therefrom; 

(2) That he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property; 

(3) That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor; and, 

(4) That he fails to do so for a period of two months after such account should be rendered. 

The glaring differences between the elements of these two offenses necessarily imply that the requisite evidence to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused would certainly differ in each case. Hence, petitioner's acquittal in the anti-graft case provides no refuge for him in the present case given the differences between the elements of the two offenses." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Given the foregoing, the high court upheld the conviction of the accused under Article 218 of the RPC, notwithstanding his acquittal under Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

The test, therefore, is not whether or not the there is only a single act, but whether the crimes against which the accused is charged have the same or similar elements, such that one crime is absorbed or absorbs the other.

What kind of Unlawful Aggression is necessary in Self-Defense?

Back in high school, sometimes, merely staring at someone the wrong way can lead to altercations or fights. In fact, I remember instances during my high school days when some of my batch mates or school mates would engage in fist fights for the dumbest reason, such as "masama ang tingin" or "ang angas (o yabang) kasi ng tingin", etc. (perks of being in an exclusive for boys school)

Now, when a person whose on the receiving end of these "dagger looks", so to speak, reacts violently and kills or injures the one giving the same (or vice-versa), can that person later raise self-defense to excuse himself from criminal liability?

The answer is no.

People vs. Jefferson Nicdao, G.R. No. 208678, 16 June 2014, is exactly a case of this type. Here, the victim, a certain Lou Anthony, was shot in the forehead by accused Jefferson Nicdao (Jefferson), after Lou Anthony (who was tipsy after having drunk 3 bottles of red horse) went to Jefferson's group's table at a bar and allegedly called Jefferson's group out for giving Lou Anthony's group "dagger looks".

Although Lou Anthony's companion, a certain Claudinick, apologized for the former's behavior, which Jefferson and his group seem to have accepted. It appears that Jefferson, before he and his group left the bar, later approached Lou Anthony's group and without warning, hit Lou Anthony's head with a gun and shot him in the forehead. All in an apparent act of revenge.

During his trial for murder, Jefferson raised self-defense, and alleged that when he (Jefferson) approached Lou Anthony's group to settle their previous misunderstanding, Lou Anthony grabbed him by his collar and uttered offensive words, after which he (Jefferson) instinctively reached for his gun and then shot Lou Anthony.

The trial court did not believe Jefferson's claims and found him guilty of murder. This conviction was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals on appeal.

When the case reached the Supreme Court, the high court agreed with both the trial court and the Court of Appeals and upheld their finding of guilt, ruling that the circumstances of the case preclude the existence of Self-Defense.

According to the Supreme Court, the laws set strict parameters for self-defense, such that whenever it is invoked, the following elements should be present:

(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;

(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and

(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.

In this case, not even the first element of unlawful aggression is present. Contrary to Jefferson's claims, the perceived violent and aggressive attitude of Lou Anthony does not sufficiently demonstrate that Jefferson's life was in real peril. In fact, a review of the circumstances of the case shows that it was actually Jefferson, rather than Lou Anthony, who was the aggressor, to wit:

"From the prosecution and defense witnesses' testimonies, it was clear that Lou Anthony did not perform any act that put Jefferson's life or safety in actual or imminent danger. The perceived violent and aggressive attitude of Lou Anthony did not sufficiently demonstrate through acts that confirmed Jefferson's fear for a real peril. While it was established that Lou Anthony approached his assailant's table and confronted them for alleged dagger looks, he neither uttered threats nor inflicted physical harm upon Jefferson's group and instead voluntarily returned to his table after the confrontation. Such was also the situation at the time that Jefferson inflicted the fatal wound upon Lou Anthony. It was then evident that Jefferson was the aggressor rather than the object of the victim's alleged aggression. Jurisprudence holds that "if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel."

Accordingly, as there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim (Lou Anthony) self-defense cannot be appreciated in favor of Jefferson. In fact, even assuming that Lou Anthony's acts can be considered as an "aggression", the Supreme Court held that not every form or degree of aggression justifies a claim of self defense, thus:

"The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)(citing People vs. Nugas, G.R. No. 172606, 23 November 2011)."

Hence, the test is whether or not the victim's aggression placed the defender's life in real peril. Consequently, even if the person gives you "dagger looks", utters offensive words, or even appears to be hostile against you, as long as there is no real threat on the life or personal safety of the defender, violence cannot be justified and self-defense may not be invoked.