CIVIL PROCEDURE; Courts should exercise caution in exercising their authority or power to dismiss a case motu proprio on the ground of the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute

In Republic v. Heirs of Enrique Oribello, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 199501, 6 March 2013, the Supreme Court reminded trial courts to exercise their power to dismiss a case motu proprio with caution. According to the Supreme Court, “[r]esort to such action must be determined according to the procedural history of each case, the situation at the time of the dismissal, and the diligence (or the lack thereof) of the plaintiff to proceed therein. If a lesser sanction would achieve the same result, then dismissal should not be resorted to, thus:

“While it is within the trial court's discretion to dismiss motu proprio the complaint on the ground of plaintiff's failure to prosecute, it must be exercised with caution. Resort to such action must be determined according to the procedural history of each case, the situation at the time of the dismissal, and the diligence (or the lack thereof) of the plaintiff to proceed therein.  As the Court held in Gomez v. Alcantara, if a lesser sanction would achieve the same result, then dismissal should not be resorted to. 

‘Unless a party's conduct is so indifferent, irresponsible, contumacious or slothful as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, i.e., equivalent to default or non-appearance in the case, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount to achieving the desired end. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or of a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss. (Emphasis supplied)’”

In Republic, the trial court therein deemed the Republic of the Philippines to have abandoned its complaint for reversion due to non-appearance at a hearing. The respondent argued that this declaration of abandonment is tantamount to a dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute. Since the Republic failed to appeal the said order, the order should be considered final, hence properly leading to the dismissal of the case.

The Supreme Court did not side with the respondent on this point. Instead, the Supreme Court examined the records and noted that the Republic was merely deemed to have terminated its presentation of evidence. According to the High Court, the records of the case clearly belie the argument that there was manifest lack of intent to prosecute. While there was delay, this was not sufficient to cause the dismissal of the case motu proprio:

“Based on the records, petitioner has presented testimonial evidence on various hearing dates and marked numerous documents during the trial of Civil Case No. 225-0-92. Such acts do not manifest lack of interest to prosecute. Admittedly there was delay in this case. However, such delay is not the delay warranting dismissal of the complaint. To be a sufficient ground for dismissal, delay must not only be lengthy but also unnecessary resulting in the trifling of court processes. There is no proof that petitioner intended to delay the proceedings in this case, much less abuse judicial processes.

While petitioner failed to appear on the hearing of 12 September 1997, such failure does not constitute a ground for the dismissal of the reversion complaint for failure to prosecute. Petitioner's non-appearance on that date should simply be construed as a waiver of the right to present additional evidence.” (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)