CIVIL LAW; TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE; Not present when the intrusion is impelled by purely economic motives

Analita P. Inocencio v. Hospicio De San Jose

G.R. No. 201787, 25 September 2013

"We also find that HDSJ did not commit tortious interference. Article 1314 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 1314.Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. 

As correctly pointed out by the Inocencios, tortious interference has the following elements: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the contract; and (3) interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse.

The facts of the instant case show that there were valid sublease contracts which were known to HDSJ. However, we find that the third element is lacking in this case.

In So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals, we held that there was no tortious interference if the intrusion was impelled by purely economic motives. In So Ping Bun, we explained that:

'Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the defendant acts for the sole purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. One view is that, as a general rule, justification for interfering with the business relations of another exists where the actor's motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where his sole motive is to cause harm to the other. Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferer's interest outweighs that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in self-protection. Moreover, justification for protecting one's financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives.'

The evidence shows that HDSJ entered into agreements with Ramon's former sublessees for purely economic reasons (payment of rentals). HDSJ had a right to collect the rentals from the sublessees upon termination of the lease contract. It does not appear that HDSJ was motivated by spite or ill will towards the Inocencios." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

CIVIL LAW; LEASE; Essentially not personal in character; No novation in sublease; Lessee can sublease as long as it is not expressly prohibited; When Lessor should pay 1/2 value of improvements introduced

Analita P. Inocencio vs. Hospicio De San Jose

G.R. No. 201787, 25 September 2013

In this case, the Supreme Court held the clause "contract is non-transferable unless prior consent of the lessor is obtained in writing" to refer to transfers inter vivos and not transmissions mortis causa.

Since lease contracts are not personal in character, the SC explained that the rights of a lessee may be transferred to an heir via intestate succession and unless prohibited, the heir can exercise the same rights as the lessee-predecessor-in-interest.

A lessee is also not prohibited from sub-leasing the leased property or premises provided no express prohibition exists in the contract of lease. When there is a sub-lease, there is likewise no novation of the contract of lease, since the original juridical relation between the lessor-lessee remains (as opposed to an Assignment of the Lease when the lessee is replaced by the assignee).

Another notable point made in this case is the fact the simultaneous lease of the building likewise includes with it, the lease of the land on which the property is located. Thus, rental payment for the building includes rental for the lot.

With respect to improvements introduced by the lessor in good faith on the property, the SC held that the lessor is entitled to be paid 1/2 value of the improvements introduced at the time the lease is terminated, provided that the following requirements are present: (1) the improvements were introduced in good faith; (2) the improvements are useful; and (3) suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form and substances.

Should the lessee refuse to reimburse the lessor, the latter may then cause the demolition of the improvements introduced.

ADMIN. MATTER; PAO Clients not exempted from the payment of Sheriff’s Expenses since these are not properly considered as “Fees”; to allow free access to courts, however, PAO officials and employees are now authorized to serve subpoenas, summons, and other court processes in cases involving their clients

Re: Letter dated April 18, 2011 of Chief Public Attorney Persida Rueda-Acosta Requesting Exemption from the Payment of Sheriff’s Expenses

A.M. No. 11-10-03-O, 30 July 2013.

Sheriff’s Expenses are different from Sheriff’s Fees.

“Sheriff's expenses, however, cannot be classified as a "fee" within the purview of the exemption granted to PAO's clients under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406. Sheriff's expenses are provided for under Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, viz.

xxx

Sheriff's expenses are not exacted for any service rendered by the court; they are the amount deposited to the Clerk of Court upon filing of the complaint to defray the actual travel expenses of the sheriff, process server or other court-authorized persons in the service of summons, subpoena and other court processes that would be issued relative to the trial of the case. It is not the same as sheriff's fees under Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which refers to those imposed by the court for services rendered to a party incident to the proceedings before it.” (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

PAO Lawyers now authorized to serve summons, subpoenas, and other processes on behalf of their clients or only in cases involving their clients.

“The Court, however, is not unmindful of the predicament of PAO's clients. In exempting PAO's clients from paying docket and other legal fees, R.A. No. 9406 intended to ensure that the indigents and the less privileged, who do not have the means to pay the said fees, would not be denied access to courts by reason of poverty. Indeed, requiring PAO's clients to pay sheriff's expenses, despite their exemption from the payment of docket and other legal fees, would effectively fetter their free access to the courts thereby negating the laudable intent of Congress in enacting R.A. No. 9406.

Free access to the courts and adequate legal assistance are among the fundamental rights which the Constitution extends to the less privileged. Thus, Section 11, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that "[f]ree access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty." The Constitution affords litigants — moneyed or poor — equal access to the courts; moreover, it specifically provides that poverty shall not bar any person from having access to the courts. Accordingly, laws and rules must be formulated, interpreted, and implemented pursuant to the intent and spirit of this constitutional provision.

Access to justice by all, especially by the poor, is not simply an ideal in our society. Its existence is essential in a democracy and in the rule of law. Without doubt, one of the most precious rights which must be shielded and secured is the unhampered access to the justice system by the poor, the underprivileged and the marginalized.

Having the foregoing principles in mind, the Court, heeding the constitutional mandate of ensuring free access to the courts and adequate legal assistance to the marginalized and less privileged, hereby authorizes the officials and employees of PAO to serve summons, subpoena and other court processes pursuant to Section 3, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The authority given herein by the Court to the officials and employees of PAO shall be limited only to cases involving their client.

Authorizing the officials and employees of PAO to serve the summons, subpoenas and other court processes in behalf of their clients would relieve the latter from the burden of paying for the sheriff's expenses despite their non-exemption from the payment thereof under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406. The amount to be defrayed in the service of summons, subpoena and other court processes in behalf of its clients would consequently have to be taken from the operating expenses of PAO. In turn, the amount advanced by PAO as actual travel expenses may be taken from the amount recovered from the adversaries of PAO's clients as costs of suit, attorney's fees or contingent fees prior to the deposit thereof in the National Treasury.” (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)